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Not only did private households in the United States.
save less than German households in the 1990s,their
savings rate also decreased faster.If,however,public
and business savings are taken into account, the dif-
ference between both countries’ savings rates seems
less significant. Furthermore, the US overall savings
rate rose for several years while Germany’s declined
constantly. Interest rate developments are partly
responsible for the diminishing propensity to save of
private households in both countries.A better labour
market performance, higher and rising wealth, and
success in balancing the public budget weakened the
savings efforts in the United States.A rising old-age
dependency ratio in Germany reduced the savings of
private households.Since the United States are high-
ly attractive for international investors, investment
there was financed more easily by foreign capital.
While the United States have been very successful in
increasing economic growth,fighting unemployment
and reducing public deficits during the 1990s,
Germany still has to solve fundamental problems
regarding all these indicators. At the same time, a
brief comparison of both economies shows signifi-
cantly lower savings in America. Macroeconomic
theory offers two perspectives on the impact of sav-
ings on economic growth:
• According to Keynesian theory, current savings
slow down economic growth.Savings are equated
to a lack of consumption and therefore a trouble-
some lack of demand.
• For neo-classical economists, savings are funda-
mental to investment. Higher investment boosts
growth – in the short run as a part of total
demand, in the long term by raising the stock of
capital. The new growth theory stresses technical
progress initiated by savings.
This survey first focuses on savings and consumption
of private households as well as on business invest-
ment in Germany and the United States between
1991 and 2002.This will be followed by an analysis of
differences in measurement methods and a discus-
sion of potential explanations for differences in both
countries’ savings behaviour.
Savings, consumption and investment
Most studies on savings behaviour focus on the sav-
ings of private households. The savings rate of pri-
vate households – nominal savings as a percentage
of nominal personal disposable income – was sig-
nificantly higher in Germany between 1991 and
2002 than in the United States (Figure 1a).The dif-
ference between both countries’ savings rates was
4.7 percentage points in 1991,rose to 7.8 percentage
points in 2001 before slightly declining to 6.7 points
in 2002.
This difference in levels has to be separated from the
diverging development over the period analysed. In
Germany, the savings rate was quite stable.
Influenced by the tax cuts in 1986, 1988 and 1990 it
reached 13 percent at the beginning of the 1990s
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 1999) before declining to
9.8 percent in 1999 and 2000.An increase in the sav-
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ings rate to 10.4 percent in 2002 could be observed
recently.The situation in the United States was com-
pletely different. The savings rate dropped much
faster from an already lower level of 8.3 percent in
1991 to its minimum of only 2.3 percent in 2001. A
slight recovery took place in 2002, when savings
reached 3.7 percent of nominal personal disposable
income. As a first result, savings by private house-
holds in the United States were lower than those in
Germany and there was a stronger reduction of pri-
vate savings in the United States in the 1990s.
From a Keynesian point of view, the different devel-
opments in both countries’ private consumption are
the expected counterpart of their declining savings
(Figure 1b). Nominal consumption expanded much
faster between 1991 and 2002 in the United States
(84 percent) than in Germany (46 percent). Higher
nominal savings in Germany seem to go along with
less dynamic nominal consumption compared with
the United States.A comparison in real terms shows
a huge gap as well: While real consumption rose by
47 percent in America, the increase turned out to be
only one third of this in Germany.
According to neoclassical theory,the sharper decline
of private savings in the United States should have
led to a corresponding low level of capital formation.
However,empirical findings show a different picture
for the period 1991/2002 (Figure 1c):
• Nominal net investment in the United States rose
by almost 90 percent, although the year 2000 was
a turning point.While private investment was fos-
tered by rising stock prices during the New
Economy era, the fall of stock prices since spring
2000 and the fading information technology
boom led to reduced investment.
• In the United States, the decline of nominal fixed
capital formation since 2000 (by 37 percent) hap-
pened to be less severe than in Germany (by
49 percent). In Germany, investment more or less
stagnated from the early 1990s until 2000. After
its sharp fall in 2001 and 2002,nominal net invest-
ment in fixed capital was not more than half of its
1991 level.
The focus of this analysis is on nominal net invest-
ment. There are two reasons for this perspective.
First:Saving rates are calculated in nominal terms.
Second: Net savings are by definition savings less
depreciation. To guarantee comparable results, it
is necessary to consider net investment (gross
investment less depreciation). By the way, the
development of real gross capital formation shows
similar results: While it increased by almost 80
percent in the United States between 1991 and
2002, it stagnated in Germany.The decline of real
investment since 2002 has been sharper in
Germany (by 11.6 percent) than in the United
States (by 4.4 percent).
A positive nexus between capital formation and
the savings of private households cannot be
deduced from these empirical findings. Rising
investment is combined with lower and shrinking
savings rates in the United States, while Germany
had to face a sharp drop in net investment despite
higher and less declining savings efforts. Obviously,
high savings of private households do not seem to
be a prerequisite for higher investment. Never-
theless, this does neither prove the irrelevance of
the neoclassical view on savings and investment
nor does it validate the Keynesian connection of
savings and consumption. However, two questions
emerge:
1. What kinds of methodical empirical problems
may be overlooked in a comparison of German
and US savings rates? 
2. Which macroeconomic determinants can explain
the different savings behaviour in Germany and
the United States?
Savings rates – a variety of definitions
As a result of various differences in national data,
international comparisons are difficult. Data on sav-
ings used in this survey are taken from the OECD
national accounts. The table gives an overview over
commonly used definitions of savings rates. It is
remarkable how big the differences are between the
various rates for the year 2002. These differences
result from gross and net values, different base val-
ues and different sectors.
Net savings rates are commonly used in Germany
while some other countries prefer gross values.
Unfortunately, the OECD mixes savings rates based
on net and gross values in an important overview
table (OECD, 2003a). The difference between the
two concepts is depreciation. Gross savings contain
net savings and depreciation and therefore have a
systematically higher value than net savings..We will
focus on net savings, because funds that must bespent for imputed capital consumption during the
current production process cannot be interpreted as
savings in the conventional sense. Furthermore, the
base chosen to calculate the rates is important as
well. Macroeconomic savings of all sectors can be
related to GDP (OECD, 2003a) or to the disposable
income of all sectors which is on a significantly lower
level. This explains a discrepancy of 4 percentage
points in the case of Germany in 2002.
An enormous difference exists between gross and
net savings rates of all sectors related to the dispos-
able income of the whole economy.The gross savings
rate amounted to 16.6 percent in the United States
and to 24.5 percent in Germany in 2002.At the same
time, the net savings rate was only 1.9 percent in the
United States and 6.4 percent in Germany.The main
reason is the diverging dynamics of capital consump-
tion (depreciation). Besides different methods of
calculating capital consumption, growing net invest-
ment and a rising capital stock result in higher
depreciation in the United States.
Sectoral savings
To analyse the sources of the divergence in the sav-
ings behaviour between Germany and the United
States it is helpful to consider savings rates of the
various sectors of an economy – private households,
business and the government.This shows the distrib-
ution of the macroeconomic net savings among these
sectors.
A look at the German and US sectoral savings rates
and the resulting macroeconomic net savings rate
over the period 1991/2002 shows significant differ-
ences in level, already documented in Table 1, but
also differing sectoral profiles during that period.
The dominance of consumer savings in Germany is
striking. Savings of private households ranged
between 7.6 and 10 percent from 1991 until 2002 and
represented the bulk of macroeconomic savings,
although a moderate downward trend can be noticed
(Figure 2). As savings are related to disposable
income of all sectors and not to disposable income of
households only, the savings rates of private house-
holds in Figure 2 differ from those in Figure 1.
The savings rate of the business sector turns out to
be less stable than that of the private households.
Between 1991 and 2002, it ranged from – 0.6 to
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Gross and net savings ratios 2002
– in percent –
Gross/net Sector Base Germany USA
gross savings ratio all sectors gross domestic product 20.5 14.5
gross savings ratio all sectors disposable income
1) 24.5 16.6
net savings ratio all sectors disposable income
1) 6.4 1.9
net savings ratio government disposable income
1) –2.9 –2.5
net savings ratio business enterprises disposable income
1) 1.2 1.5
net savings ratio private households disposable income
1) 8.2 3.0
net savings ratio private households disposable income
2) 10.4 3.7
Gross savings = net savings + depreciation. 
1) Disposable income of all sectors. 
2) Personal disposable income.
Source: OECD, 2003c; Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft Köln.
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2.2 percent of all sectors’ disposable income.Current
business savings equal the undistributed profits of
incorporated firms, not withdrawn profits of unin-
corporated firms and net current transfers. One
reason for the dominance of private households in
macroeconomic savings is the development of
government savings, which mostly offset corporate
savings throughout the period. Government savings
equal the disposable income less consumption
expenditures of the public sector. In the best case,
government reduced the macroeconomic savings
rate by 0.2 percentage points only.
The situation is fundamentally different in the
United States (Figure 2). Over time, the macroeco-
nomic savings rate is lower than in Germany but the
composition of savings is quite different. Private
households did not stabilise total savings as they did
in Germany. In fact, their savings rate declined from
7.1 percent in 1991 to a minimum of 1.9 percent in
2001 before increasing again to 3.0 percent in 2002.
In contrast, business savings grew remarkably more
than in Germany.With savings rates between 1.2 and
3.4 percent there was no single year over the busi-
ness cycle in which business dissaved in contrast to
Germany in 2000 and in 2001.
This development was dominated by heavily fluctu-
ating government savings which determined overall
macroeconomic savings in the United States. Public
saving turned from a negative 5.3 percent in 1992 to
positive savings rates at the end of the 1990s,peaking
at 2.9 percent in 2000. Rising government spending,
large tax cuts and the economic slowdown following
the New Economy boom led to a drop of the public
savings ratio to a negative 2.5 percent in 2002.
A comparison of German and
US savings rates on the macro-
economic level provides a sharp-
er picture than an analysis on
the basis of private households
alone. However, both perspec-
tives show smaller saving efforts
in the United States than in
Germany. The difference in the
levels of the net savings rate of
all sectors between Germany
and the United States averages
2.7 percentage points from 1992
to 2002. Savings rates of private
households as a percentage of
personal disposable income dif-
fer by 6 percentage points. The
macroeconomic savings rate in Germany declined
slowly but constantly. In the United States, the over-
all savings rate increased until the end of the 1990s,
but tumbled sharply in 2001 and 2002.
Determinants of savings behaviour
Differences in level, development and composition
of the German and US savings rates should be
explained by various determinants of savings behav-
iour. Therefore, six categories will be examined to
find some of the reasons for the specific savings
efforts in both countries.
Interest rates
Inflation adjusted interest rates are relevant for
intertemporal consumption decisions. High real
interest rates raise the price of present consumption
and foster savings. Furthermore, interest rates have
an impact on capital income and therefore on the
ability to save.A number of studies covering several
(Hussain/Brookins, 2001) or single countries such as
Germany (Deutsche Bundesbank,1996;1999) or the
United States (Kauffmann, 1988; Sherman, 1999;
Milleker, 2002) confirm a connection between inter-
est rate developments and savings behaviour:
• In the second half of the 1990s, the level of Ger-
man real interest rates was slightly higher than in
the early 1990s, which were characterised by
major fluctuations. But a look at the average
hides that real interest rates declined from 5 per-
cent in 1995 to less than 3 percent in 2001.
Between 1995 and 2000,US interest rates were on
Figure 3average 0.4 percentage points
lower than during the five
preceding years. In both
countries, savings of private
households followed the
development of real interest
rates. Diminishing inflation
and rising real interest rates
in the last few years also coin-
cide with growing savings
rates of private households.
• But the constantly growing
gap between German and US
savings rates of private
households cannot be ex-
plained by a permanently
growing interest rate differ-
ential (Figure 3).Between 1995 and 2002,average
interest rates after adjustment for inflation were
only 0.1 percentage point higher in Germany than
in the the United States.
Growth and unemployment
The economic situation may also affect savings
behaviour (Ohmayer, 1997).While some economists
postulate a positive correlation between income
growth and savings, others predict higher savings of
private households in times of high unemployment.
Although the growing number of unemployed may
save less than before, the larger group of the
employed may increase their savings efforts to have
a nest egg in case of unemployment:
• Economic growth in the United States was sub-
stantially higher than in Germany – on average by
about 2 percentage points in the period
1992/2000.The shrinking differential between the
macroeconomic savings rates – it was only
0.2 percentage points in 1999 – reflects the deteri-
orating relative growth position of Germany.
• Unemployment dynamics are one of the most
striking differences between the two economies
(Figure 4). The United States managed to create
new jobs and to halve the unemployment rate to
a minimum of 4 percent in 2002, while Germany
had to face an increase of its unemployment rate
to 9.7 percent in 1997 before it slightly decreased
to 7.8 percent in 2001.However,cyclical weakness
of economic activity since 2001 has led to a signif-
icant increase in US unemployment.
Lower and decreasing savings efforts of private
households in the United States can be explained by
the lower risk of losing one’s job and income due to
a more favourable development of the labour mark-
et. Additionally, more flexible labour markets pro-
vide better chances of finding a new job in the
United States, which leads to diminished savings
efforts as well.
Wealth
An increase in assets can have two causes: Savings
out of current income build up wealth, and rising
prices of existing assets (e.g. property, stocks) result
in a higher value of assets.In the latter case,it can be
possible to achieve a certain wealth level without
saving more out of current income. Therefore, a
higher share of current income could be used for
consumption which is equivalent to a decreasing sav-
ings rate. A boost to wealth caused by sustainable
asset price increases can be interpreted as a substi-
tute for savings out of current income (Davis/
Palumbo, 2001; Sherman, 1999).
Capital gains are neither calculated as income or
savings in the German nor the US national accounts
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 1999; Perozek/Reinsdorf,
2002). In periods of rising capital gains, national
accounts calculations come to lower figures for
income and savings than if capital gains were consid-
ered (Peach/Steindel, 2000; Milleker, 2002).Accord-
ing to OECD data (OECD,2003b),stock prices rose
much faster in the United States (212 percent)
between 1991 and 2000 than in Germany (196 per-
cent). However, from 1995 to 2000, German stocks
gained about 160 percent while US stocks lagged
behind with an increase of 121 percent. But the
decline after the peak in 2000 was stronger in
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Germany: by 42 percent compared to 18 percent in
the United States.
From 1991 to 2002, total financial assets of private
households  – bank deposits, insurance contracts,
securities and company pension reserves less liabil-
ities – rose by 77.5 percent in Germany to q2,195
billion or 159 percent of the annual disposable
income of private households. Asset growth was
slightly weaker in the United States (73 percent).
Despite the massive reduction since its peak in
1999, the wealth ratio (net financial assets in per-
cent of disposable income) was still significantly
higher in the United States (276 percent) than in
Germany (Figure 5). Although the stock markets
were more stable in the United States, the higher
commitment to stocks and strongly rising liabilities
led to a pronounced reduction of net financial
assets there.
Summing up, different levels of German and US
wealth ratios can be part of an explanation of the dif-
ferent levels of savings rates. Higher wealth ratios
are supposed to reduce savings rates (Milleker,
2002). The relatively strong increase in the US
wealth ratio between 1995 and 1999 corresponds to a
marked decrease of the savings ratio of private
households. Both countries have faced a shrinking
wealth ratio since 1999 combined with rising savings
rates.
Government
The fundamental influence of government savings
on the macroeconomic savings ratio was already
shown (Figure 1). Between 1991 and 2002, the aver-
age public deficit in the United
States was only 0.2 percentage
points lower than in Germany.
But a closer look at the public
deficits shows a more significant
difference. Although the US
deficit has grown rapidly recent-
ly,a more successful balancing of
the government budget was
achieved during the 1990s com-
pared with Germany’s weak
consolidation efforts. Moreover,
in the years from 1998 to 2000
the United States realised a bud-
get surplus. This happened only
once in Germany: One-time
receipts of the G3-auctions led
to the reduction of the total public debt in 2000. As
higher deficits today may mean higher taxes tomor-
row, private households build up reserves for these
expected payments (Hussain/Brookins, 2001).
Accordingly, the more comfortable state of public
budgets in the United States made a reduction of
savings efforts plausible.
The conditions for economic activity are very differ-
ent in the United States and Germany (Kauffmann,
1988).The lower US tax burden allows a freer dispo-
sition of personal income and provides better oppor-
tunities for higher savings. Nevertheless, private sav-
ings in the United States were on a much lower level
than in Germany. Yet, changes of the savings rate
between 1991 and 2000 show the expected connec-
tion. The faster increase of the tax burden in the
United States (2.8 percentage points) relative to
Germany (1.1 percentage points) reflects a corre-
sponding decrease of the differential in the savings
rates of private households.
Demography
According to the life-cycle hypothesis of savings, the
creation of financial reserves is expected to take
place during one’s working life. These reserves can
be used for consumptive purposes in old age. This
combination of saving and dissaving should stabilise
personal consumption over the expected lifetime
(Doshi, 1994). Therefore, an ageing society is sup-
posed to accumulate more reserves in order to
finance a longer period of retirement.
One demographic feature that may partly explain
differences in savings between Germany and the
United States is the financial burden on employees
Figure 5caused by a growing proportion of older people.
Between 1991 and 2002,the total population grew by
3.0 percent in Germany and by 13.5 percent in the
United States. In Germany, the population of work-
ing age (15 to 64 years) rose by 1.1 percent only, the
number of people above 64 years of age grew by
19.0 percent. In the United States, the fraction of
people between 15 and 64 years of age rose by
15.1 percent while the number of people older than
64 years increased by 11.8 percent only. America is
much less affected by the ageing of its population
than Germany.
An analysis of both countries’ old age dependency
ratios comes to the same results. From 1991 to 2002
the population above 64 years of age as a percentage
of the population between 15 and 64 increased from
21.8 percent to 25.6 percent in Germany. In the
United States, this ratio even shrank from 19.1 per-
cent to 18.6 percent.The difference between the two
countries’ old age dependency ratios almost tripled
from 2.6 to 7.1 percentage points, paralleling the dif-
ference between the corresponding savings rates of
private households (Figure 6).
According to the life-cycle concept,a growing share
of older people should have led to a reduced sav-
ings rate. A stronger decline of private savings
would have been expected in faster ageing
Germany (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1999). Ins-
titutional factors seem to be a decisive explanation
of the differences between the two countries. As a
result of the great weight of the statutory pay-as-
you-go pension system in Germany, the liquidation
of private reserves is less important in one’s old age.
Therefore,the ageing population had a smaller neg-
ative influence on the total sav-
ings of private households.
International capital flows
In an open economy, the volume
of investment and savings during
a certain time period need not be
equal. International capital flows
can settle the balance. If the for-
eign exchange account is bal-
anced, a capital account surplus
corresponds to a savings gap.
Insufficient domestic savings can-
not finance all of domestic invest-
ment. In other words: The option
to use internationally mobile cap-
ital for domestic investment can have a negative effect
on domestic savings efforts (Hussain/Brookins, 2001).
The experience of the United States in the 1990s
does not contradict the results of Feldstein and
Horioka (1980).According to them,a significant cor-
relation between domestic savings and investment
existed in the past.In fact,the savings rate of private
households declined, which ran counter to the
investment boom during that time (see Figure 1).
Nevertheless, Figure 2 showed an increase in macro-
economic savings for several years.Furthermore,the
United States realised a powerful capital account
surplus. Capital imports exceeded capital exports by
far, making it possible to finance the investment
boom despite the shrinking savings rate of the pri-
vate households.High growth rates and good domes-
tic business conditions made the United States an
attractive location for international investors.On the
other hand, despite high German savings rates,
investment in Germany remained static because of
unsolved structural problems.
In the course of weak world-wide economic growth in
recent years, the focus turned back on possible risks
of the huge US capital account surplus.A reduction of
the corresponding large current account deficit may
well trigger declining investment as long as the sav-
ings rate stays low. Surveys of the last four decades
have come to the result that US capital and current
accounts have always been balanced by an adjust-
ment of investment (Olivei,2000).In this case,the low
savings rate limits long-term investment possibilities
and therefore potential growth.In Germany,high sav-
ings rates should permit a strong increase of domestic
investment, if the general business framework can be
improved by fundamental reforms.
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